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Introduction
Despite the weight of public procurement in governmental budgets (OECD.Stat 2017), 
procurement activity is still one of the most vulnerable vehicles open to corruption (Mur-
ray 2014; OECD 2015). In that context, corruption can have many forms (Angulo Garzaro 
2018) and occur at any point in the procurement cycle—from the pre-tendering to the ten-
dering and the past-award phases—making it difficult to detect and measure (Mufutau and 
Mojisola 2016; Rustiarini et al. 2019; Whiteman 2019). In Brazil alone, corruption in pro-
curement contracts can represent an additional cost of 20% to 30% over the expected price, 
which represents losses of around 200 billion Reais annually (Zeferino 2020). Likewise, in 
Europe, it is estimated that losses figure around 5 billion Euros annually (Hafner et al. 2016). 
Naturally, these losses undermine the ability of governments and public authorities to forge 
ahead with essential investments in health, education, infrastructure, security, housing, and 
social services (Søreide 2002; Beittel et  al. 2019). Unsurprisingly, there is a considerable 
effort to develop analytical solutions to understand and mitigate the effects of corruption 
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in the public procurement process (Fazekas et al. 2018). Te increasing availability of open 
data concerning public administration activities (Curado et al. 2020) has recently renewed 
the scientific community’s efforts to uncover hidden connections between participating 
agents and how their relationships can link to fraudulent activities (Herrera 2019; Kertész 
and Wachs 2021).
One of the most challenging aspects of identifying corruption in public procurement 
contracts is the lack of labeled data. Indeed, it is largely impossible to know which instances 
stem from corruption (Wachs and Kertész 2019). However, a fundamental principle in pub-
lic procurement is that of transparency in bidding (Adjei-Bamfo et al. 2019; Angulo Garzaro 
2018; Nowrousian 2019; Spagnolo 2012), and efficiency can be obtained through independ-
ent and open competition between firms. In that sense, past works have approached this 
problem from an unsupervised learning perspective, meaning that they look to extract 
information about the relationships between the involved parties and, thus, flag groups 
of agents with patterns that might be linked to a high risk of corrupting activities. Indeed, 
firms can achieve leverage to manipulate the tender process by establishing the right rela-
tionships among themselves and coordinate their activity (Hanák and Serrat 2018).
An open issue remains, can communities of firms obtained from co-bidding patterns 
allow us to highlight groups that are more susceptible to collusion and market manipula-
tion? The use of network analysis for the study of corruption is not new (Lauchs et al. 2011; 
Chang 2018; Grassi et al. 2019). In the context of public procurement, past studies can be 
divided into two main groups: (1) works that explore bipartite relationships between public 
bodies and firms (Fazekas and Tóth 2016; Wachs et al. 2019); and (2) studies that explore 
firm–firm co-bidding relationships in public tenders (Toth et al. 2014; Reeves-Latour and 
Morselli 2017; Morselli and Ouellet 2018; Wachs et al. 2020). Both approaches have their 
merits, and each is suitable to identify different mechanics underlying the manipulation 
of the procurement process. For instance, bipartite relationships are suitable for identi-
fying fraud stemming from bribes and influence ties, while firm–firm relationships are 
more suited to identifying cartels and collusion. Despite these, the use of network analy-
sis to study the relationship between firms in procurement bids is a relatively new venture 
(Reeves-Latour and Morselli 2017). More evidence is required to understand the universal-
ity of the existing patterns and mechanics across cultural and socio-economic contexts.
Here, we use network science and complexity sciences methods to map and characterize 
the co-bidding network (Wachs and Kertész 2019; Piccolo et al. 2018; Ramalho et al. 2020; 
Reeves-Latour and Morselli 2017) between firms that participated in public tenders issued 
by the 184 municipalities of the state of Ceará (Brazil). In that sense, we characterize of the 
relationships between competing firms and identify the major communities of firms that 
often compete for tenders with a similar scope. Moreover, we argue that some such com-
munities have characteristics that place them at a higher risk of market manipulation and 
irregular activities often associated with corruption.
Data
We used data from the State of Ceará Audit court authority—Tribunal de Contas do 
Estado Ceará (Brazil) covering public tenders issued by the 184 municipalities of the 
State of Ceará between 2015 to 2019. Each observation informs about a firm’s bid to a 
tender and whether the bid was one of the winning bids. It also includes information 
Page 3 of 10Lyra et al. Appl Netw Sci            (2021) 6:77  
about the municipality that issued the tender, and whether a firm won a contract. Hence, 
the data is naturally represented through a bipartite nature (Fierăscu 2017), which con-
nects firms to tenders (see Fig.  1a). The data set contains 196,608 observations that 
account for the bids of 45,502 firms to 84,835 tenders.
Information about the firms and tenders is anonymized, and bidding values are not 
available. Moreover, the data set does not contain information about which contracts/
firms have been investigated for irregularities in the past.
Network inference
Since we are interested in studying the relationships between firms we focus on the 
Firm–Firm projection. We estimated the projection from the co-bidding patterns of 
firms (Piccolo et al. 2018) using the Jaccard similarity coefficient (Veech 2013; Mainali 
et  al. 2017; Chung et  al. 2019; Wachs and Kertész 2019). Figure  1a shows a graphical 
illustration of the data structure and depicts the steps conducted to infer the Firm–Firm 
network from the original Tender-Firm bipartite structure.
In order to infer the Firm–Firm co-bidding network, we started by discarding all firms 
that did not bid at least once during each year under analysis. By doing so, we were able 
to extract the core of active firms, while removing firms with sporadic activity. Figure 1b, 
Fig. 1 Panel a, graphical representation of the process employed to infer the Firm–Firm co-bidding network. 
Panel b, comparison between the frequency of bidders per tender in the original data set (gray) and in the 
working data set (red) after filters have been applied. Panel c, comparison between the frequency of bids per 
firm in the original data set (gray) and in the working data set (red) after filters have been applied. In panels 
(b) and (c) dashed line represents the OLS regression lines, the domain of the line indicates the domain used 
for fitting the curve
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c compare the original ( PALL ) with the filtered data set ( PSample ). In particular, it shows 
that filtering removes excess participants from tenders while not affecting the distribu-
tion of the number of bids done by each firm. Likewise, we refer to firms present in the 
firm–firm co-bidding network as Established firms. The final working data set includes 
1906 firms, which account for 72,078 bids to 39,523 tenders.
Hence, next, we compute the centered Jaccard/Tanimoto coefficient (Chung et  al. 
2019) between each pair of firms. The centered Jaccard coefficient measures the similar-
ity between the bidding of two firms, accounting for the occurrence probabilities of each 
firm. Formally, it can be computed as:
where bit is one if firm i made a bid to tender t, being zero otherwise; and pi is the frac-
tion of tenders in which firm i participated ( pi =
∑
k bit ). The second term in Eq. (1) 
provides the expected number of observations when the bids from both firms are inde-
pendent and identically distributed through a Bernoulli process (Chung et  al. 2019). 
Hence, the centered Jaccard coefficient allowed us to distinguish between positive and 
negative associations between firms, accounting for their individual level of activity.
Finally, we estimate the significance of the observed J cij , to test the hypothesis that 
J cij > 0 . To that end, we bootstrapped a null distribution ( ̂Jij ) of centered Jaccard coeffi-
cient for each pair of firms by generating an ensemble of 1000 randomizations of the ini-
tial bipartite network. Data was randomized in order to ensure that the number of bids 
observed per firm and per year remained constant while preserving the number of firms 
bidding to each tender. Then, we estimate the one-tailed p-value associated with J cij by 
calculating the upper tail probability of obtaining a value equal or greater than J cij from 
the cumulative frequency of the null-distribution Ĵij (Gotelli 2000). Links with a p-value 
greater than 0.05 were discarded.
The resulting firm–firm co-bidding network contains 1529 nodes and 12,892 edges. 
Relationships are treated as undirected and unweighted. The network exhibits an average 
degree of 16.86, with a cluster coefficient of 0.52 (Newman et al. 2020), and 56 connected 
components. Figure 2 shows the Degree Distribution (Fig. 2a) decays exponentially with 
the degree, which suggests that the underlying mechanics of co-bidding can be approxi-
mated by a random attachment process (Albert and Barabási 2002). Alternative distribu-
tion (e.g., power-law) has been tested but shown a worst likelihood given data. However, 
the average clustering coefficient shows a power-law inverse relationship with the degree 
(Fig. 2b), suggesting the existence of some level of hierarchy in the structure of the net-
work. It is noteworthy to mention that the largest connected component contains 1141 
nodes, 10,630 edges, and a clustering coefficient of 0.43.
Results and discussion
Figure 3 presents the giant component of the firm–firm co-bidding network. Using the 
Louvain algorithm (Blondel et al. 2008) we identified 22 communities with a modular-
ity of 0.66. We refer to these communities as C1 , C2, . . . ,C22 , and they are indexed in 
descending order in respect to their size. For readability, we have colored the eight larg-




k(bit + bjt − bitbjt)
−
pipj
pi + pj − pipj
,
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and can be explained by the fact that the network primarily represents competing firms 
that are specialized in supplying different services–works, goods, services, etc–in differ-
ent regions. Hence, the most prominent communities divide the network into two major 
groups of firms that operate mainly in the northern (Red, Blue, and Green) and south-
ern (Purple and Yellow) regions of the state of Ceará, but also on contracts that supply 
Food services (Blue and Purple) or construction works (Red and Yellow). Interestingly, 
Fig. 2 Panel a shows the degree distribution, D(k). The dashed black line represents the best exponential 
distribution fitted to the empirical distribution’s tail ( k > 5 ). Panel b shows the average clustering coefficient 
average per degree, C(k). The dashed black line shows the best linear fit. The results have been estimated 
from the entire graph
Fig. 3 Graphical representation of the Firm–Firm network, which relates firms with similar bidding patterns. 
In order to build the network, we only considered the most active firms and edges with a significant Jaccard 
similarity index. Represented is the giant component with some relevant disconnected components. 
Nodes in the giant component are colored according to one of the eight major communities (out of 22) 
identified using the Louvain algorithm (Blondel et al. 2008). The presented partition of the network achieved 
a modularity of 0.61. North and South categorization of the firms location was used here in a broader sense 
and should not be confused with the Mesoregions, which we identified with their Portuguese names. For 
reference, the North includes the Mesoregions of Norte and Noroeste; while the South includes Sul and 
Centro Sul
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the remaining communities operate at a state-wide level (Pink and light Blue), and there 
is one particular community (Violet) that operates exclusively in the mesoregion of Jag-
uaribe only supplies Food services.
In some cases, firms form densely connected sub-graphs (e.g., C14 ). These structures 
can be a first indicator to flag groups of firms that present a high risk of collusion and 
procurement manipulation. As such, next, we explore possible additional metrics to 
classify each community of firms through their activity in order to further narrow which 
groups of firms might deserve a more profound investigation by audit officials.
Activities diversity
We started by looking at the regional diversity on which firms performed their activities 
(e.g., bid on tenders in order to supply services) and the diversity of the type of contracts 
for which they bid. While a firm with low diversity in both regional reach and contract-
type can simply indicate a firm that is narrow in both scope and domain; the existence 
of groups of connected firms (i.e., a community of firms) that share a low diversity in 
both dimensions can highlight a more troublesome scenario. In particular, it can indi-
cate the conditions for firms to coordinate and cooperate to control a specific market 
and regional context, and should be investigated with further discernment.
To that end, we estimate the Simpson’s diversity index1 for each community. The Simp-
son’s diversity index (  ) measures the probability that two randomly sampled elements 
from a set share a given characteristic in common. In that sense,  = 0 is associated with 
the highest diversity possible, and  = 1 with the lowest diversity. Formally we estimate 
the Simpson’s index for each community as
where ptCi corresponds to the fraction of bids done in a procurement contract type 
γ :{Consumables Health, Services, Construction, Events, Food, Fuel,…} or mes-
oregion γ :{Metropolinana, Norte, Sul, Noroeste,…} by the firms in community 




= 1.0 . We estimated Cicat independently for each community ( Ci ), and for con-
tracts according to the region that issue the tender and the tender contract type (e.g., 
services, food, tenancy, construction, etc). Our choice of the Simpson’s index over other 
alternatives (e.g., entropy) is due to its straightforward interpretation in our context: 
the probability that two bids made by firms within the same community share the same 
characteristic (e.g., region or contract type).
Figure 4a illustrates the empirical distributions ( ptCi ) of procurement activity for the 
ten most prominent communities. We show the results for both the Regional distri-
bution of activities and by Contract Type. Blue colors denote a low relative frequency 
of bids, while red identifies a high frequency. These indicators allowed us to infer the 
degree of specialization and agglomeration of a community. In particular, we found that 








1 In some fields the Simpson’s index is also known as the Herfindahl index.
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specialize in one type of contract (Food). The same conclusion can also be inferred from 
the high levels of C8cat , which means that Community 8 has low diversity of activity distri-
bution. Figure 4b compares all the 22 communities in terms of the two diversity indica-
tors defined above. We find a clustering of communities in the bottom left quadrant—a 
low level of agglomeration and specialization—that we associate with healthy markets 
composed of firms that, on average, have a diversified portfolio of activities and regional 
distribution. In contrast, in the top right quadrant, we found communities that relied on 
procurement contracts of a single type and agglomerated in a small number of regions.
The combination of these two diversity indicators, at the community level, provides 
a powerful feature to identify groups of firms that can dominate over a niche market 
or, in the worst case, develop undesirable leverage, as a group, in negotiating procure-
ment contracts. Hence, lowering the desirable efficiency that public procurement aims 
at achieving in the tendering process. However, it is important to stress that these met-
rics are just indicative of potential problems, and thus the true nature of the activities of 
the firms in each community should be carefully investigated by the corresponding local 
authorities.
Bidding coordination
To further investigate the risk/susceptibility of market manipulation by firms, we next 
looked at the propensity that each community has in participating in “single bidder” 
contracts. Another pattern often associated with corruption and loss of efficiency. 
Hence, what is the susceptibility of each community to such practice? To answer this 
question, we started by investigating the average number of times, per community, that 
a firm is the single bidder of a tender. Figure 5a shows the results for all 22 communi-
ties in the most significant component of the Firm–Firm network. Traditionally, a high 
Fig. 4 Characterization of the ten largest communities by the diversity of bids done by region and type. 
Panel a shows the distribution of bids within each community by mesoregion (left) and contract/tender 
type (right). For each community we compute the Simpson’s diversity index ( reg and serv ). The full and 
official names of the mesoregions are: Jaguaribe; Noroeste Cearense (Noroeste); Metropolitana de Fortaleza 
(Metropolitana); Sul Cearense (Sul); Norte Cearense (Norte); Centro-Sul Cearense (Centrol Sul); and Sertoes 
Cearenses (Sertão). We use simplified references to these names for visualization purposes. Panel b compares 
communities by their diversity of contracts in terms of regional span and type. Note that in panel a we only 
show results for the ten largest communities, which are representative of the results. Communities not 
identified by a color code in Fig. 2 are shown in gray in panel b, in the particular community C14 corresponds 
to the gray clique easily identifiable in the bottom left of the network in Fig. 3
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level of single bids can be an indicator of firms acting with some level of informal advan-
tage in the tendering process or due to lack of competition in a specific market. At the 
community level, such an indicator can be indicative of unusual activity from a group 
of firms. Hence, low levels of single bidding indicate the risk of coordination (e.g., firms 
participating coherently in the same contracts) while high levels can sign the prevalence 
of less competitive markets or informal advantage in the tendering process. Overall, of 
the largest ten communities, only Community 8 exhibits low levels of single bidders, a 
pattern that extends to Communities 14 and 21 as well. In contrast, we saw that commu-
nity 12 strongly deviates from the baseline with an average value of single bidding that is 
roughly four times that of a typical firm.
In addition, we looked at the average number of bidders per tender in order to assess 
the potential existence of coherent behavior, that is, coordination between the firms in a 
community. To that end, we estimated the average number of bidders per tender for each 
community, which we normalized by the size of the community (i.e., the number of firms 
in a community). Interestingly, Fig. 5b shows that in Community 8, firms tend to partici-
pate in tenders with several firms that match almost exactly the community’s size. While, 
in some cases—Communities 14 and 19—firms tend to bid to tenders that are several 
times larger than their communities. Noteworthy to mention that this analysis is biased 
by the size of the communities, so the expectation would be to see a smoothly increasing 
relationship, with the largest community achieving the smallest value, and in the limit-
ing case of a community with a single firm we would obtain the maximum. However, it is 
clear that in some cases—Communities 8, 14, and 19—there are apparent deviations.
Conclusions
In this manuscript, we explored the potential of mining a large data set of public tenders 
collected from firms’ activity to compete for procurement contracts issued by the munici-
palities of the State of Ceará (Brazil). By matching firms with similar bidding patterns, we 
have inferred a firm–firm network comprising a total of 1141 nodes and 10,630 edges.
We showed that we were able to identify communities of firms with similar bidding 
patterns. The network exhibits a high modular structure partitioned in 22 communities. 
Fig. 5 Characterization by bidding activity. Panel a shows the average number of single bids per community 
(i.e., the average number of times a firm in a community participated in a tender as the single bidder). 
We compared the values of each company with the average of the entire population of firms (horizontal 
red line). Panel b shows the average number of bidders in tenders in which firms within a community 
typically participate. We normalized the value obtained for each community by the number of firms in that 
community. The horizontal red line shows the threshold that marks the size of the community
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These communities cluster firms that have a similar scope in procurement activities both 
in the nature of the contracts they celebrated and in the regional reach of their activi-
ties. Moreover, we looked at two diversity indicators—regional diversity and procurement 
contract nature diversity—as a sign of the potential of certain communities to develop 
leverage over the procurement process. In other words, in affecting the expected effi-
ciency of the market. Finally, we looked at the sizes of the tenders, first by looking at the 
abundance of single bidders in communities, and secondly by looking at the average num-
ber of bidders in each tender. Overall we identified a particular community (Community 
8) that combines several undesirable properties. Community 8 involves a group of firms 
that offers Food services in the region of Jaguaribe. They have an unusually low number 
of single bids; the average number of participating firms per tender matches the number 
of firms in the community, and they e xhibit a high specialization and agglomeration in 
their activities. Nevertheless, having said that, such an odd combination of characteristics 
can be useful to narrow down the activities of audit officials, but it does not allow us to 
conclude much about the true nature of the activities of firms involved in Community 8.
Finally, it is essential to highlight some shortcomings in our analysis and future work-
ing directions. The lack of pre-labeled data on past corruption cases significantly lim-
its our ability to make any causal link between the network structure, its motifs, and 
the location of firms in the network with irregular procurement behavior. In that sense, 
our results are merely exploratory and show the potential of combining network sci-
ence methods with descriptive statistics to highlight relevant groups of firms according 
to their activity pattern in a data-scarce environment. Future works should look at the 
evolution of the network, that is, if a larger temporal window is available, to capture the 
evolution and segregation of communities of interest but also of their parametric path in 
terms of the diversity of their activities.
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